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“If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with
the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life ... for
fear that I should get some of his good done to me.” —Henry David
Thoreau [1854, 65]
“If men were actuated by self-interest…the whole human race would
cooperate. There would be no more wars, no more armies, no more
bombs.” —Bertrand Russell [1954, 173-74]1
The assumption that individuals are motivated by selfishness is central to most
public choice literature. Four of the key works within public choice are limited en-
tirely to this assumption: In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs
[1957] praises altruistic behavior, but nevertheless declares, “We accept the self-
interest axiom as the corner stone of our analysis.” In The Logic of Collective Action,
Mancur Olson [1965] warns that his theory has little to say about groups that form
for purely altruistic reasons. Dennis C. Mueller [1989] states in Public Choice II,
“The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an
egoistic, rational, utility maximizer.” The Calculus of Consent [Buchanan and Tullock,
1962] states the possibility that people are either altruistic or egoistic, and warns
that because of this, “The theory of collective choice can explain only some undeter-
mined fraction of collective action.”2 The entry on public choice in The New Palgrave:
A Dictionary of Economics goes farther saying, “By using a model in which voters,
politicians, and bureaucrats are assumed to be mainly self-interested, it became pos-
sible to employ tools of analysis, that are derived from economic methodology” [Tullock,
1987]. This quote implies that it is not rationality, but the more restrictive assump-
tion of selfishness, that makes the use of economic tools possible.
Selfishness is not an essential part of the assumption of rationality; any item
could go into a utility function, including consumption by other people or other people’s
utility. And if utility functions are derived solely from revealed preference, individu-
als could reveal a preference for anything. In most instances, however, economists
create utility functions not from rigorous behavioral observations but by using as-
sumptions that often limit the items in a utility function to the individual’s own
consumption. At least one public-choice problem—the problem of rational nonvot-318 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ing—is a problem only if individuals are assumed to be not only rational but also
selfish. Voting is irrational (for a selfish individual) but collectively rational. A large
amount of literature has tried to find a way to explain voting as being somehow in an
individual’s selfish interests [Aldrich, 1997] rather than simply being satisfied that
the act of voting reveals a preference for thinking collectively. Mueller suggests that
when models do not fit the notion of rational egoism, “we retain the egoistic portion
of rational egoism, and drop, or better modify the rationality assumption” [1989]. If
that is the normal practice, it is worthwhile to examine the ramifications of doing
things the other way around—dropping egoism and retaining rationality. In other
words, although selfishness is not an essential part of rationality, it is a very com-
mon assumption, which if relaxed could potentially change the predictions of mod-
els.
Many authors have called for economics in general, or public choice in particu-
lar, to relax the selfishness assumption [Sen, 1977; 1995; Margolis, 1982; Mansbridge,
1990; Simon, 1993; Brittan and Hamlin, 1995; Udehn, 1996; Eichenberger and
Oberholzer-Gee, 1998; Ostrom, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 2001]. Recent work in ex-
perimental economics has shown that the assumption that people behave selfishly
does not always hold and that the possibility of altruistic actions or preferences ex-
ists [Dawes et al., 1990; Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee,
1998]. Others have argued theoretically that altruism is an evolutionarily stable
behavior and therefore there is no reason to expect egoism to be the only possible
behavior [Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Bergstrom and Stark, 1993; Samuelson, 1993;
Ostrom, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 2001].3 Many authors believe that relaxing the
selfishness assumption will greatly change the predictions of public choice models,
but at least one believes that it does not make much difference. Margolis observes
that Downs [1957] states the pure self-interest of voters and politicians as his funda-
mental hypothesis, but “there turns out to be almost nothing in Downs’s analysis
that actually relies on the axiom of selfishness” [1982, 97].
Some critics have reached the mistaken conclusion that some public-choice prob-
lems would disappear if people behaved less selfishly in politics. Tideman [1994], for
example, supposes that the difficulties experienced with majority rule would dimin-
ish substantially if people were to act as judges of what is just rather than as advo-
cates for their own self-interest. Young [1988], citing Condorcet and Rousseau, sup-
poses that if voters are, on average, competent judges of what is just, injustice de-
creases as the number of voters increases. But these views suppose that justice is
some objective truth that can be discovered by reason, rather than a matter of indi-
vidual judgment on which people disagree. This view does not recognize that people
have many different ideological beliefs about what is best for society, creating con-
flicts that may be as difficult to resolve as those created by self-interest.
It is tempting, but incorrect, to think of altruists as a group of “Mother Theresas.”
Even if it were difficult to aggregate their preferences on some issues mathemati-
cally, a group of Mother Theresas would have few joint decision-making problems,
because they would have a very similar notion of what is good for the group, allowing
them to find compromises that they all agreed were equitable. They would probably
not be worried about trusting a dictator selected at random. But imagine Mother
Theresa in a group with John Calvin, Malcolm X, Margaret Sanger, Robert Nozick,4319 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
Karl Marx, the Dalai Lama, John Stuart Mill, and L. Ron Hubbard. All of these
people have strong beliefs about morality and social justice that are diametrically
opposed to one another. Would this group of moral individuals find it easier or more
difficult to make a joint decision than a group of purely selfish people with disagree-
ments stemming only from their material interests? The selfish group would find
many areas for mutual benefit, but the group of moralists may not find any, and they
certainly would be foolish to trust a dictator selected at random.
Many, if not most, public-choice problems stem ultimately from disagreement.
Opposing selfish interests are the most commonly given reason for disagreements,
but differing ideologies can cause similar disagreements as many, if not most, econo-
mists are at least tacitly aware. This paper explicitly examines how public choice can
be applied to pure altruists with ideological differences. I begin by defining altruism
in this context and examining how altruism has been used in public choice litera-
ture. I then discuss how to model altruism and continue by examining some common
public-choice problems. Although some of the problems change in interesting ways,
many of the same basic problems exist whether people are egoistic or altruistic. I
conclude that although attention should be paid to altruism in instances where pre-
dictions change, the assumption of rational egoistic preferences is often a reasonable
simplification for rational preferences that may be either altruistic or egoistic.
DEFINITION AND REVIEW
An altruist, for the purposes of this paper, is a person who will not seek her own
personal gain at another’s expense, but seeks the good of society as a whole as she
sees it. That is, an altruist acts in accordance with some universal principle(s) of
justice and does not violate those principles even when it would be to her own advan-
tage. Under this definition, a person need not be an egalitarian nor a generous per-
son to be considered an “altruist.” Terms such as socially concerned, public minded,
unselfish, moral, ethical, or principled could work just as well and are used inter-
changeably. As Sen [1992] observed, all systems of justice seem to imply the equality
of something, whether it is income, opportunity, libertarian freedoms, or adherence
to a religious code. Basically, any behavior that applies some principle of justice to
everyone is in this one sense altruistic, even if the principle applied to everyone is
the right to be selfish.
This definition leaves considerable room for people to act in ways that benefit
themselves, while still being considered altruistic as long as they behave consis-
tently with some principle of justice. For example a wealthy business owner may
espouse the principles of free trade, low taxes, and minimal government either be-
cause such policies benefit her or because she believes they are truly just. Similarly,
a labor union member may espouse principles of welfarism and activist government
either because such policies will benefit her or because she believes they are truly
just. Klein [1994] demonstrates that individuals tend to join groups in which their
principles and their self-interest do not conflict, so that people often sincerely believe
in principles that benefit their own group. But whether people’s principles are in line
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hand, which is: what public-choice problems can exist if people behave consistently
with some principle of justice?
This definition of altruism is in some ways more and in some ways less altruistic
than more commonly used definitions. Usually, altruism is modeled to examine the
ramifications of the tradeoff between selfish and unselfish motives [Harsanyi, 1953;
1955; 1977; Hochman and Rogers, 1969; Becker, 1974; Goodin and Roberts, 1975;
Arrow, 1981; Etzioni, 1986; Dowell et al, 1998]. These works model individuals who
include the utility of others in their objective functions but usually weight the utility
of others differently than their own utility. These papers deal with what Jencks
[1990] calls “partial” altruists. By assuming individuals follow a universal principle
in all public decision-making, this paper assumes what Jencks calls “complete” or
even “extreme” altruists, or what Brittan [1995] calls “hard core” altruists.
The models cited in the previous paragraph abstract from any ideological differ-
ences among people’s beliefs about what constitutes the public interest and assumes
that individuals know and care directly about the utility of others and/or that there
is some universally shared notion of the public good. This assumption is a useful
simplification for examining the tradeoff between selfish and unselfish motivations,
but because of it, the joint-decision-making problems in these models ultimately flow
from selfish motives. Altruism is found to be either capable or incapable of solving
these problems. These models do not ask whether altruistic motives can themselves
cause public-choice problems. To focus on that question, it is necessary to focus en-
tirely on ideologically opposed conceptions of the public interest. In this way, actors
are less altruistic in this model than in other models; they may care little or nothing
about the preferences of others. Like Lewd and Prude in Sen [1970], they care about
each other without necessarily caring about each other’s utility.5 This approach is
similar to Margolis, “the group-utility the individual seeks to maximize is his own
perception of group-interest, and by no means necessarily identical to someone else’s
perception” [1982]. However, Margolis also focuses on the tradeoff the individual
faces between group- and self-interest. The focus here is on those instances in which
the individual is wearing her group-interest hat.
Works that assume altruism without focusing primarily on the tradeoff between
selfish and unselfish desires seldom examine ideological differences. Fehr and Schmidt
[2001] use the assumption of other-regarding preferences to examine incomplete
contracts and the optimal distribution property rights, but they do not examine the
effect of different other-regarding preferences on public decision-making. Binmore
[1994; 1998] and Fender [1995] have both shown that altruism cannot solve all game
theory problems.6 Tullock [1984] considers selfish and unselfish motives, and ar-
gues, as do Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee [1998], that voters often vote for what
they see as the public interest because they have no perceived self-interest in the
matter in question. He concludes that the tendency to overlook public-interest mo-
tives in voting should be changed, but argues that the greater attention to special-
interest motives is justified because voters are apt to pay more attention to issues in
which they have a special interest. He argues that in some cases (such as pure public
goods and transfers to a wide class of people) self-interest motives are easily mistaken
for public-interest motives. He does not mention, however, that the reverse is also321 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
true; public-interest motives could be mistaken for selfish motives. We may not be
able to distinguish whether a person votes for (or against) military appropriations
because she believes they are beneficial to her or because she believes they are ben-
eficial to society as a whole, and we may not need to distinguish between the two.
People who align their selfish and unselfish motives (as Klein [1994] described) can
be considered selfish for Tullock’s analysis and altruistic for the analysis here. Thus,
there is already a great deal of overlap between the actions of people with egoistic
goals and people with altruistic, but differing, goals.
What happens to public-choice problems if unselfish people have ideological dif-
ferences? The closely related discipline of social choice, which does not include self-
ishness in its definition, provides some help [Sen, 1987; 1999]. But Sen [1977; 1995]
also speaks of the need for economics in general (including the study of public goods)
to pay greater attention to the role of morals and values in economic decisions, and
complains that game theorists too often attribute unselfish behavior to an inability
to understand strategy rather than to unselfishness. Arrow [1951] did not assume
selfishness, only rationality, to arrive at his impossibility result, and most works on
the preference aggregation problems use similar assumptions. If it is impossible to
aggregate unselfish preferences in a way that meets simple conditions for rationality
and democracy mathematically, certainly public-choice problems would exist when
people act on unselfish preferences.
The paradox of rational nonvoting is one topic for which the competing assump-
tions of unselfishness and egoism lead to strikingly different conclusions. Using self-
ish assumptions, there is an apparent anomaly. Why should a rational voter expend
any effort to vote if the chance that her vote will be decisive is negligible? Economists
have tried to maintain the selfishness assumption and explain this behavior as the
desire to express one’s preferences or as a misunderstanding of the true negligibility
of one’s own vote [Aldrich, 1998]. However, the fact that people vote is an anomaly
only if all motivations are selfish. The apparent paradox can be resolved quite simply
by inserting concern for others into the individual’s objective function [Margolis,
1982; Aldrich, 1998]. Margolis also extends the same kind of reasoning to explain
individuals’ contribution to groups in which Olson’s [1965] theory would predict zero
contributions. If the act of going out and voting reveals a preference for unselfish-
ness, it is hardly reasonable to then say that people only vote in their own self-
interest once they get to the voting booth.
MODELING ALTRUISM
This section discusses how altruistic objectives can be modeled to allow for ideo-
logical differences. Begin with the standard assumption of a pure egoist, whose util-
ity includes only her own consumption and no variables associated with any other
people:
Ui = U(g1, g2, … gn), or Ui = Aig1, + Big2, + Cig3, …322 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Even a person who maximizes her own utility could be considered a principled
altruist under some conditions. Suppose she believes that the existing political pro-
cess is a perfectly fair, just, and rational method to aggregate individual preferences
into social preference (or at least the best available method), but that doing so re-
quires everyone to push for their own individual preferences. With these beliefs,
even an egoist could be an altruist, as it is defined here, but this is clearly not the
type of altruist we are most concerned with.
Arrow [1981] uses a utilitarian model of partial altruism that he traces back to
the Bergson-Samuelson approach to social welfare functions [Samuelson, 1947]. As
Arrow characterizes it, an individual maximizes her own personal social welfare
function [Wi(x1, …, xn)] composed of her own utility [Ui(xi)] plus the sum of everyone
else’s utility [ÓU(xj)], under the assumption that ui(xi) > u(xj). That is, starting from
an equal distribution, the marginal utility of one’s own consumption is greater than
the marginal utility of another’s consumption.
Wi(x1, …, xn) = Ui(xi) +  U(xj), for all ji
He also assumes that everyone evaluates each others’ utility in the same way
according to some social norms or a code of ethics (there are no ideological differ-
ences). Certainly, if this assumption is relaxed, there is room for ideological conflicts
even within the utilitarian characterizations of social welfare functions depending
how utilities are weighted and summed. But, to examine conflicting ideologies, there
are four reasons to look beyond utilitarian characterizations: First, utilitarianism is
only one of many ideologies. Second, to the extent that people are concerned with the
utility of others, they are often bad at assessing other people’s preferences. Third,
utilitarian social welfare functions show concern only for outcomes and not for the
process by which those outcomes are determined. Fourth, using the utility of others
implies that to be concerned with others’ well-being is to be concerned with their
well-being as they see it. Economists routinely make the assumption that an indi-
vidual is the best judge of her own welfare, but many moral systems believe the
individual is an inherently poor judge of her own welfare, and is better off the more
she represses her desires. The do-gooder at Thoreau’s door or the person who does
not want his neighbor reading Lady Chatterly’s Lover both display an unselfish con-
cern for others, but care little about the utility of others.
Buchanan and Tullock [1962] discuss a social scientist who comes up with an
axiomatic social welfare function based on his beliefs about what are or what ought
to be the shared goals of society. Suppose each individual behaves like this social
scientist. Whenever she participates in the public-decision-making process, she puts
aside her own egoistic preferences, and seeks to maximize her own axiomatic social
welfare function. In other words, replace Mueller’s [1989] “rational, egoistic, utility
maximizer” with a “rational, altruistic, welfare maximizer,” using Margolis’s [1982]
assumption that this notion of the public interest need not be the same or even very
similar to anyone else’s. It will not be necessary here to look at any more than two
goods (g1 and g2), which could stand for one private good and one public good or two
public goods. Two people (1 and 2) would have the following social welfare functions323 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
(W1 and W2). The weights person 1 puts on the two goods are shown by A1 and B1, and
the weights person 2 puts on the two goods are shown by A2 and B2.
W1 = A1 g1 + B1 g2
W2 = A2 g1 + B2 g2
These welfare functions can be as different as:
W1 =   g1 + g2
W2 = g1   g2.
That is, one person’s good is another person’s bad.
These social welfare functions are similar to utility functions except that indi-
viduals don’t give any special weight to their own consumption. They make choices
on public-goods issues based on their assessment of society’s needs and they make
choices on distributional issues based on principles of entitlement or desert.
These functions can work for utilitarians as well; they would simply derive their
axiomatic social welfare function from their assessment of others’ utility functions.
But they may not work as well for a deontologist, who does not care directly about
outcomes but only about the rights or responsibilities of individuals. A deontologist’s
social welfare function might not contain any goods at all but only the vector of
rights or responsibilities (ri) accorded to each individual (j).
Wi = rij
Often, beliefs about rights and responsibilities can be expressed as beliefs about
the desired levels of public goods spending that are likely to go along with them. For
example, a libertarian anarchist would simply weight all publicly produced goods as
zero. A worshiper of Apollo would place a large coefficient on the public good of
Greek temples. Thus, the axiomatic welfare function seems to work fairly well to
describe deontological beliefs. But at least one responsibility cannot be characterized
by a coefficient on the goods in the welfare function: the belief that the decision-
making process should be fair or that one person’s action in the political process
should conform to some code of behavior, even at the expense of reaching the just
level of spending on a public good. Hylland describes these kinds of preferences in
this way, “I would prefer living in a democracy and not getting my way in issue y
than being a dictator” [1986]. Except for the strictest deontologist, the desire for
fairness need not be an overriding ethical concern; individuals may face a tradeoff
between behaving fairly in the decision-making process and achieving their most
desired outcome. I might prefer losing on issue y to being a dictator, but I might be
willing to commit a small breech of ethics to get my way on y, if the end benefit to
society is great enough to justify the means. To show this tradeoff, add a fairness
function [f(*)] to the individual’s social welfare function, making it a broader objec-324 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
tive function. The fairness function depends on the actions (ai) of the various partici-
pants and of the institutional setting (I).
O1 = Ag1 + Bg2 + f(ai, I)
The relationship between individual i’s actions and her fairness function is obvi-
ous; all else equal she prefers more to less fairness. But the relationship between
others’ actions or the institutional setting and i’s fairness function is less certain.
The mostly intuitively appealing relationship is that if others don’t play fair or if the
institutional setting is unfair, i feels released from her obligation to play fair. But the
opposite reaction is also possible: Seeing others playing dirty i might feel self-righ-
teous and play as fair or even fairer than before, allowing the decisions on issue y to
go against her, but keeping her integrity.
Aggregating individual social welfare functions into a true social welfare func-
tion poses problems. And of course, the question of how to aggregate the social wel-
fare functions of people with different ideologies is itself an ideological question,
about which people will have opposing beliefs, which would need to be aggregated to
determine a group preferences for determining group preferences. Without passing
judgment on what is the best way to aggregate preferences, the next section follows
Fender [1995] and Hammond [1987] in using purely egoistic preferences as a bench-
mark for comparison.
ALTRUISM AND JOINT-DECISION-MAKING PROBLEMS
A true altruist will not intentionally seek personal gain at the expense of others.
Therefore, rent seeking cannot exist in a purely altruistic society, but many of the
problems associated with rent seeking can be caused by unselfish ideological differ-
ences. This section examines manipulation of the political process, the Ostrogorski
paradox, the principle-agent problem, free riding, and the prisoners’ dilemma, show-
ing that, among altruists, behavior so similar to rent seeking exists that at times
altruism is almost indistinguishable from rent seeking.
Manipulation of the Political Process: Logrolling, Cycling, Agenda
Manipulation, and the Misrepresentation of Preferences
People tend to think of altruists as people who not only want the best for society
but also always play by the rules, never lie, and never attempt to manipulate the
process.7 Mueller [1989, 82] asserts that the existence of logrolling in the U.S. con-
gress despite the moral stigma attached to it is evidence that members of Congress
pursue selfish interests. Even Buchanan and Tullock [1965, 13], who otherwise de-
fine rational behavior quite broadly, say that the need for constitutional limitations
on power comes from the fear that someone will exploit power for their own gain.
But what does an altruist do when her beliefs about what outcome is best for society
conflict with her reluctance to manipulate the political process? Apparently these
authors assume that all altruists are extreme deontologists, who believe that it does325 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
not matter what the outcome is as long as they behave fairly. In terms of the objec-
tive function: there is no amount of public benefit that she would accept in trade
against her desire to behave fairly:
f(ai) > W(gj) for all i, all j, and all quantities of g.
This is a one-sided conception of altruism. It is equally plausible that altruists
are so committed to their beliefs about what outcomes are desirable, that they will
use any means necessary to achieve their goals. It seems more reasonable that altru-
ists care about both process and outcome, and that they must consider tradeoffs
between the two.
Tullock [1984, 96-97] shows that unselfish desires of voters are no less likely to
be traded by legislators than selfish desires of voters. He first demonstrates that it is
difficult for a legislator to tell, and unimportant for her to know, whether the goals of
her constituents are selfish or unselfish. In either case, candidates engage in both
implicit and explicit vote trading to win enough support to get elected and reelected.
Therefore, even if voters are ethical, representatives who are willing to trade votes
are likely to replace those who are unwilling. But Tullock does not ask whether the
legislator is herself ethical. Even if logrolling is not evidence of selfishness of voters,
is it, as Mueller supposes, evidence of the selfishness of legislators? The following
example shows that neither the willingness to trade votes nor any other manipula-
tion of the political process provides any such evidence.
Consider the familiar problem of cutting the cake [Skaperda, 1998; Baron and
Kalai, 1993]. Moe, Larry, and Curly have one cake and must decide by majority-rule
how to divide it. If they vote selfishly, cycling results: Any two can divide the cake in
half and cut out the third, but then the person left out can break the coalition by
offering a better deal to either of the members. The person who is newly left out then
offers a deal to break that coalition, and the process can go on forever without reach-
ing a decision. Some mechanisms can deal with this problem in the presence of self-
ishness, but clearly the problem would disappear if voters were unselfish. If each of
the three cared about the others as he cared about himself, and if the three did not
differ in terms of some criteria of need or desert, the solution of cutting the cake into
three even pieces is obvious—no voting paradox and no cycling.
But, with a slight change in the assumptions, three principled judges of what is
just could have as much difficulty reaching a rational, democratic decision as the
three self-interested voters. Assume a different situation: there is a kitchen that
contains all the ingredients necessary to bake a cake. Moe arrives at the kitchen
first, plants a flag, and claims the kitchen and all of its contents as his property.
Then he steps out to buy a lock. While he’s gone, Larry arrives, and bakes a cake
with ingredients he finds in the kitchen. Finally, Curly arrives; through no fault of
his own, he has been wandering in the desert for several weeks, and is on the verge
of starvation.
A panel of three disinterested judges must decide who takes the cake or in what
proportions to divide it. Their only goal is that the outcome is just. They all have a
strong fairness function, so that each votes only for what he believes to be the most326 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
just outcome. Judge A believes in pure property rights based on the principle of first-
come-first-served; he votes that Moe take the entire cake. Judge B believes that a
worker is entitled to the entire product of his labor and votes that Larry take the
entire cake. Judge C believes in the principle from each according to their abilities,
to each according to their needs, and noticing that both Moe and Larry are a little
overweight and have no need for dessert, she votes that Curly take the entire cake.
Table 1 shows the only possible outcome under these assumptions.
If each of the three judges votes only for what she believes to be just, they cannot
give the cake to anyone; the only result is no decision. They can only make proposals,
and have them defeated time after time or until the cake goes bad. Call it “the para-
dox of sincere voting” or “the refusal-to-logroll paradox.” The only way to reach a
decision is to compromise, but that requires logrolling. At least two of the judges
have to say to each other, “I will vote to distribute some of the cake based on your
principle, if you vote to distribute some of the cake based on my principle.” It would
be irrational for a judge to vote only for the most just outcome if doing so meant that
the actual outcome was the worst possible outcome. Therefore, Mueller [1989, 82] is
mistaken in his contention that vote trading is evidence that members of Congress
pursue selfish interests. Rationality will force the fairest judge to trade votes.
If logrolling is something that the fairest judge in the world must do sometimes,
what it the root of the moral stigma against it? Perhaps, each vote-trader resents the
other legislators who forced him to trade a just vote for an unjust vote. If Judge A
compromises with Judge B, whom he believes to be immoral, he may feel that he’s
made a deal with the devil. He is disappointed that the outcome is not as just as it
should be even though, given the immoral beliefs of the other judges, no fairer out-
come is possible. People have a tendency to identify their own ideology with the good
of society as a whole, and others’ ideologies with selfishness, and may believe that
vote trading stems ultimately from the selfishness of others. Therefore, constituents
may feel resentment that legislators must engage in vote trading while simulta-
neously being pleased in their legislator’s adeptness at doing so.
Cycling, which Tideman [1994, 350] supposes will arise when the majority as-
serts the public interest as a cover for private interests, can also happen among
these disinterested judges. Judge A and B can decided to split the cake 50-50 be-
tween the owner and the worker, but Judge C can offer Judge A a 60-40 split be-
tween the owner and the needy, and so on. Thus, the same kind of cycling can exist
between disinterested judges just as it can between Moe, Larry, and Curly. Both
TABLE 1
The Refusal to Logroll Paradox
Proposal Judge A Judge B Judge C Outcome
1 Moe takes the cake Yes No No No (2 to 1)
2. Larry takes the cake No Yes No No (2 to 1)
3. Curly takes the cake No No Yes No (2 to 1)
Result No decision327 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
Tideman and Young [1988] believe that cycles will be less likely and that competent
judges will be more able to resolve them than self-interest advocates. I can see no
reason, however, why the three disinterested parties (arguing from moral beliefs)
would any more easily reach a three-way compromise, than the three interested
parties (arguing from selfishness).
In fact, solutions that could work for selfish negotiators would not work for un-
selfish judges. Brams and Taylor [1995] extended the incentive-compatible “cut-and-
choose” decision protocol to a multi-person setting. Three selfish people, who would
like as much as they can get but who have some willingness to accept their “fair
share” may well agree to a decision rule that will lead to all three being treated
equally. But three disinterested judges who believe only their own judgment repre-
sents justice may not be willing to accept a process that treats different moral judg-
ments as equally valid and that tries to obtain a “fair division” between the three.
Only when there is some underlying agreement about what division constitutes fair-
ness can such a solution be acceptable to opposing parties. Without it, a division of
the spoils between only two parties may seem morally superior to equal division.
Cycling may be slightly less likely with a group if the judges differ in their moral
distaste for vote trading. There are of course many explanations for stability using
selfish assumptions [Tullock, 1981], but unselfishness may provide another. As a purely
selfish person, the only object in Moe’s objective function is his own consumption:
UM = CM.
Therefore, Moe (like Larry and Curly) will have an incentive to make any trade that
makes the final outcome more desirable. But, altruists have to deal with a fairness
function. Thus, Judge A’s objective function would be:
OA = CM + f(vote trading)
If Judge A has a greater moral repugnance against vote trading than the other judges,
she will be more reluctant to compromise. The additional units of consumption she
gets for Moe may not offset the disutility she receives from trading her vote. If Larry
and Curly make a deal to split the cake in half, Moe goes home with nothing, and
therefore he has every incentive to break that coalition. If Judges B and C make a
deal, Judge A goes home with the satisfaction of believing that she was the only
judge who behaved justly. It is hard to say whether this sort of tradeoff would lead to
significantly less willingness to trade votes, when the vote trading of others is likely
to lead one to have less respect for the purity of the political process and more will-
ingness to trade votes. But for whatever it is worth, she has less incentive to break
the coalition. To the extent that the fairness function affects behavior, the same
unwillingness to logroll that made it more difficult to reach any outcome also makes
it more likely that the decision, once reached, will be stable—not any more rational
or democratic, but more stable.
Although logrolling may be necessary to reach a rational outcome in some cases,
misrepresentation of preferences and agenda manipulation are not. Yet, the same328 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
kinds of tradeoffs between a more just outcome and a more just process may make
altruists willing to use these strategies. Suppose that Judge C is actually an egalitar-
ian (prefers an equal distribution of cake) instead of an entitlement theorist. Seeing
that A wants all the cake to go to Moe and B wants it all to go to Larry, it may be wise
of A to pretend that she wants all of the cake to go to Curly in order to make the
egalitarian solution appear to be a compromise. Again her willingness to do this
depends on how she weighs the justness of the outcome against the fairness of her
action. Similarly if she could manipulate the agenda in some way to reach her de-
sired outcome, she may be willing to do so.
Thus, although unselfish people may have some desire to play by the rules, there
is not one dirty trick (that we can say with certainty) an altruist will not play. Thus,
the need for constitutional limits on power comes not only from the fear that some-
one will manipulate it for personal gain but also from the fear that someone will
exploit it to promote her own conception of the public interest.
The Ostrogorski Paradox
The Ostrogorski paradox shows how the fulfillment of the majority’s preferences
can make everyone worse off, such as electing a candidate who holds a minority
opinion on all issues [Kelly, 1989; Nermuth, 1992]. In one version, three voters use
the majority rule to redistribute income. Each of the three possible majority coali-
tions votes to take two dollars from the third voter and redistributed it among them-
selves, but one dollar is lost in transactions costs. Thus, although each decision ben-
efits the majority that votes for it, every voter is worse off than they would have been
if none of the votes had taken place. This example involves pure rent seeking, and
cannot happen if people are unselfish. Something very similar, however, can hap-
pen. Milton Friedman [1962] used an informal example in his book Capitalism and
Freedom that was in fact an Ostrogorski paradox motivated solely by concern for the
public interest. He argued that many different majority coalitions could be persuaded
to ban many other kinds of speech and nearly everyone would find herself wanting
to say something that had been banned by the majority. Thus, it would be possible,
he hoped, for a majority coalition of voters to see that it is in the interest of society to
ban the banning of any kind of speech.
The Ostrogorski paradox may be more difficult to resolve when individuals are
altruistic than when they are selfish. Tullock [1984] argues that intellectuals could
make a real contribution by pointing out the costs of special interest legislation, and
hopefully the bulk of such legislation would not pass. Economists have made efforts
for many years to point out these costs with little success. If voters are motivated
purely by self-interest and these government actions are inefficient forms of rent
seeking, it would be in the interest of everyone to form a broad coalition to ban all
such government actions. Why has no such coalition formed?
The answer could be in public interest voting. If individuals see the government
decisions that they favor as good for society as a whole and they see the government
decisions that they oppose as unethical or as wasteful rent seeking, they may not see
the connection between the two, or they may not feel that they should agree to ac-329 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
cept reduced spending on just programs simply to get rid of wasteful programs. A
broad ban on whatever spending might be motivated by rent seeking is bound to ban
at least one program that each voter believes is just, and it may be impossible to form
the broad coalition necessary to pass such legislation. Also, the belief in the social
desirability of small government is itself an ideology that may be favored by those
who have the least to gain from redistribution motivated by altruism and the most to
lose from redistribution motivated by rent seeking. Proposals to reduce government
waste (no matter how sincere) from a group with a small-government ideology are
likely to be viewed suspiciously by people with other ideologies.
The Principal-Agent Problem
Would an altruistic politician be more or less faithful than a selfish politician to
the concerns and desires of her constituents? The answer depends on how the politi-
cian views her role. If she believes she has been elected by her constituents to serve
their interest, she may feel a duty to vote for their ideology over her own, and she
would face a tradeoff between achieving the best outcome for society as she sees it
and being fair to her constituents. If instead she believes she has been elected to use
her own judgment, she will pursue her own vision of what is best for society con-
strained only by her desire to be reelected (so that she can continue to do what’s best
for society in her next term). That is, she would be no more constrained by the
desires of her constituents than the selfish representative.
Yet, society’s expectations of elected representatives seem to be schizophrenic.
One the one hand, we want representatives who are faithful to their constituents’
desires; on the other hand, we want bold leaders who are not afraid to take unpopu-
lar stands. Even some public choice economists who study problems of mechanism
design recognize the desire for leaders who act on their own principles. Downs [1957]
and Tullock [1984] both praise representatives who take unpopular stands as rare
examples of principled behavior. This statement seems to imply that mechanisms
are designed too well. If, on some issue, a representative knows better than the
majority about what is in the long-term interests of society, she should have discre-
tion to follow her own beliefs. But, from a constituent’s point of view it makes little
difference whether a representative misrepresents her preferences because of ideo-
logical differences or because of selfishness. Allowing representatives to have more
discretion would also allow the representative to pursue her own agenda (whether
selfish or ideological). Given that tradeoff, the much-berated pandering politician
might be the best option available.
Will the principle-agent problem exist between legislatures and bureaucrats if
both are altruistic? The usual model of bureaucracy assumes that a bureaucrat gains
prestige by increasing the size of her own agency. Thus, she will mislead legislators
about the needs of her agency in an attempt to make it as large as possible [Mueller
1989]. An altruistic bureaucrat would not seek to improve her prestige at the ex-
pense of society. However, having committed her career to an agency, a bureaucrat
is likely to favor a larger version of her agency than the median legislator or the
median voter. If these are differences of sincere belief about the net benefit to soci-330 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ety, the altruistic bureaucrat has an incentive to mislead legislators just as the pres-
tige-seeking bureaucrat would (as long as her commitment to the fairness of the
process doesn’t get in the way).
Free Riding and the Prisoners’ Dilemma
The classic case of a free rider (who believes that the benefits of a public good are
greater than its cost, but still does not contribute to its production because she has
no selfish incentive to do so) could not exist with purely altruistic individuals. Under
some circumstances, however, altruists may take a free ride. For example, Tim would
rather see public television disappear than pay any amount to support it. But as long
as others are generous enough or foolish enough to create it, he has no guilt about
receiving the signal, which clearly does no harm to anyone else. This is free riding
without the free-rider problem: the free-rider problem is not that someone consumes
something without paying for it but that someone who would be willing to pay for
something has no incentive to do so. The guilt-free free rider is not willing to contrib-
ute voluntarily under any incentive structure, and so his lack of contribution is not
a free-rider problem. The only efficiency problem here is that supporters of public
television might waste effort trying to create a mechanism to give Tim an incentive
to contribute. Supporters may believe that everyone who watches has a responsibil-
ity to contribute regardless of his personal preferences. This is a problem, but it is
not the free-rider problem; it is the problem of agreeing to a group preference.
The prisoners’ dilemma changes character when players are altruistic. Take for
example the classic prisoners’ dilemma above with two players—George and Jerry.
Table 2 shows their payoffs from a purely egoistic standpoint. Suppose George and
Jerry are both altruists who maximize the following objective function:
Oi = PG + PJ + f(ai),
where, PJ = Jerry’s payoff, PG = George’s payoff, and f(ai) is the fairness function.
Assume player i’s fairness function is affected only by her own actions, with the
following payoff structure:
f(ai) = 1, if player i cooperates.
f(ai) = 0, if player i does not.
Table 3 shows the payoff structure of this game in terms of the unselfish payoff
structures (with the egoistic payoffs in parentheses).
This is not a very interesting game. Cooperation always dominates. There is no
prisoners’ dilemma. Many authors before have shown that altruism can solve the
prisoners’ dilemma [Parfit, 1984]. Sen criticizes economists for ascribing cooperative
behavior in prisoners’ dilemma experiments not to unselfishness but to the inability
to understand the game [Sen, 1977]. Fender [1995] draws the same conclusion about
altruism and the standard prisoners’ dilemma, but also shows a case in which ex-
treme altruism can cause a prisoners’ dilemma. All that is necessary to create this331 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
altruists’ dilemma is to assume that each player wants to maximize the other player’s
egoistic payoff, and to reverse the benefits from not cooperating, as in Table 4.
If both George and Jerry are willing to sacrifice their own private benefits to
maximize the other’s, neither cooperates, and both end up with nothing. Unselfishly
trying to benefit your neighbor at your own expense can create the same kind of
problems as selfishly trying to benefit yourself at your neighbor’s expense. But such
a result relies on a very strong desire to sacrifice oneself for others: why do the two
players care so much about the other’s egoistic payoffs when neither cares much
about their own? Fender concludes that it is not a situation that is very likely to
happen.
Could a prisoners’ dilemma exist with individuals who cared equally about them-
selves and others, but had ideological differences? One could imagine a wealthy egali-
tarian giving his money to a poor libertarian who gives it right back rather than
violate his distaste for charity. If they lose some money in transactions costs, both
end up worse off, but that again doesn’t sound very likely. It does not seem possible
to create a prisoners’ dilemma without either selfishness or very extreme unselfish-
ness. However, people who care equally about each other can face a closely related
problem. Assume George and Jerry are both strict utilitarians who maximize the
total payoff to society as a whole, with no concern for distribution, and they face a
game with the payoff structure in Table 5. If one fails to cooperate, while the other
cooperates, the increase in his own benefit would outweigh the cost to the other. But
if both attempt to increase the benefit to society by failing to cooperate, both become





Jerry (1) Cooperate 1, 1  1, 2
Don’t cooperate 2,  1 0, 0
TABLE 3
Altruists Play the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
George
Contribute Don’t contribute
Jerry Contribute 3 (1), 3 (1) 0 (2), 2 ( 1)





Jerry Cooperate 1, 1 2,  1
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ute (as long as she maximizes the total payoff to society as a whole), and the game
has two Nash equilibriums [(0,4) and (4,0)], and which to choose becomes a coordina-
tion problem, and both Fender [1995] and Binmore [1994; 1998] have demonstrated
that altruism does not solve coordination problems.
The more interesting case, from the perspective of differing visions of what is
good for society, is that in which the two fundamentally disagree about what the
cooperative outcome is. In such a case, the prisoners’ dilemma does not exist, but can
appear to exist. Suppose George and Jerry consider voluntarily contributing to a
joint project; George believes the project is good for both of them, while Jerry be-
lieves the project is worthless. George perceives the game as a typical prisoners’
dilemma, just as in Table 2. Jerry perceives the game very differently with the purely
egoist payoffs shown in Table 6.
George seeks to maximize the social welfare function as he sees it, which is the
same as the one specified in Table 3. Jerry seeks to maximize a social welfare func-
tion based on the egoist payoffs as she sees them in Table 6. Because he sees no
benefit at all from contributing to this project, he need not have any fairness func-
tion in his social welfare function. His social welfare function is simply:





Jerry Cooperate 1, 1 0, 4
Don’t cooperate 4, 0  1,  1
TABLE 6
Jerry’s Perception of the Game
George
Contribute Don’t contribute
Jerry Contribute  1,  1  1, 0
Don’t contribute 0, -1 0, 0
TABLE 7
A Contribution Game among Altruists




Jerry Contribute  2 ( 1), 3 (1)  1 ( 1), 0 (2)
Don’t Contribute  1 (0), 2 ( 1) 0 (0),  1 (0)333 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
If both players seek to maximize their own social welfare function, the payoff struc-
ture is shown in Table 7. The number in parentheses shows their purely egoistic
payoffs.
The equilibrium in this game is in the lower left cell: George contributes and
Jerry does not. If George thinks Jerry’s behavior comes from selfishness rather than
from a differing view of what’s good for society, he might try to punish Jerry by not
contributing, but that is hardly punishment for Jerry, and won’t introduce any change
in his strategy. George would be better off from an egoist perspective if he stopped
cooperating, but his fairness function prevents him from doing so. This kind of com-
mitment to fairness could explain the observation in game theory experiments, in
which some players continue to contribute to the cooperative fund after it is appar-
ent that they will not induce others to contribute. If George’s fairness function is
affected by Jerry’s action, his payoffs could change to make neither contributing the
equilibrium. Jerry’s behavior does not reveal to George whether he truly disagrees
with the goals of the cooperative project or whether he is playing his selfish payoffs
in a normal prisoners’ dilemma. Thus, George may misidentify a free-riding problem
where none exists.
Disagreement about the value of the goal of a project can also cause gradual
desertion from voluntary cooperation, just as selfish free riding can. Suppose Jerry,
George, and Cosmo are three altruists considering voluntary contributions to a joint
project. Jerry opposes the project and will not contribute. George contributes as long
as everyone contributes. Cosmo contributes as long as at least one other person con-
tributes. If Cosmo and George contribute in the first round, George will desert in the
second, which will induce Cosmo to give up in the third. From all appearances, this
coalition fell apart because of free riding. Nothing in Jerry’s behavior reveals that he
is a dissenter and not a free rider.
George and Cosmo might try to solve the free-rider problem by using their power
as the majority to force everyone to contribute. From George and Cosmo’s perspec-
tive, they have simply found a socially beneficial solution to the free-rider problem,
but from Jerry’s perspective he is the victim of rent seeking. Whether rent seeking
exists or not depends on whether the definition of rent seeking requires malice. If
rent seeking means seeking selfish benefit at the expense of someone else, there is
no rent seeking here, but if rent seeking means imposing your vision of the good
society on someone else against his will, there is rent seeking here.8 Thus, some part
of what we call free riding and rent seeking is actually the results of ideological
clashes.
It may be almost impossible to solve the free-rider problem without committing
this form of rent seeking. To see this, depart from the assumption of pure altruism,
and suppose that every person except one believes that a certain public good is desir-
able and worth the cost. The large coalition of those willing to contribute cannot
sustain voluntary contributions because of the free-rider problem. They are willing
to sign an agreement to contribute if everyone else contributes, but they cannot
leave out the one person who is ideologically opposed, because that would give any-
one in the coalition the ability to free ride by claiming ideological opposition. The
coalition of supporters cannot solve their own free-rider problem without harming334 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the one who is truly opposed to the project. That is, as long as someone is ideologi-
cally opposed, the majority cannot solve its free-riding problem without being guilty
of ideological rent seeking, or conversely society cannot eliminate rent seeking (by
leaving public goods spending to voluntary contributions only) without allowing public
goods to be under-produced because of free riding.
CONCLUSION
The assumption of selfishness is often justified on the grounds that people very
often behave selfishly. But that assumption is also justifiable on the grounds that as
long as people disagree about what the public interest is, the assumption of selfish-
ness works pretty well as a simplification. A close look at public-choice problems
under the assumption of altruism shows that altruism doesn’t eliminate most public-
choice problems, although it changes the character of some. Any manipulation of the
political process (including logrolling, agenda manipulation, and misrepresentation
of preferences) can exist even if altruists are less willing to do these things than
egoists. To say that these actions cannot exist would be to assume that participants
always care more about the fairness of the decision-making process than they do
about the justness of the outcomes of that process. Ideological differences can create
the Ostrogorski paradox and make it more difficult to resolve than if interests were
purely selfish. The principle-agent problem is not likely to be much different under
the altruistic assumption. The prisoners’ dilemma exists if people are either selfish
or extremely selfless, but generally goes away if people care equally about them-
selves and others. However, it takes only a small amount of selfishness to make free-
riding and prisoners’-dilemma situations reappear, and therefore the attention to
them is justified. Free riding can exist, however, even if the free-rider problem does
not. Under altruistic assumptions in many cases, people who appear to be “free riding”
or “rent seeking” are actually behaving unselfishly according to their own ideology.
As long as individuals are rational, public choice is irrelevant only in those very
few issues on which a majority of citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians not only be-
have unselfishly but also share a wide agreement about what constitutes the public
interest. Why consensus exists on some issues and not others is an interesting ques-
tion to the theory of preference formation. But how altruists behave once a true
consensus exists is not very interesting from the standpoint of a theory of public
decision-making. The hope that Tideman [1994] and Young [1988] have for a reduc-
tion in the extent of joint decision-making problems is premature. As long as partici-
pants are rational and disagree, public choice theory cannot be safely ignored, whether
participants are selfish or unselfish.
NOTES
Thanks to: Ken Koford, two anonymous referees, and everyone who participated in discussions of this
paper at several conferences.
1. As quoted by Brittan [1995, 3].
2. Buchanan and Tullock [1965] do say that utility maximization need not be narrowly hedonistic, and
that as long as utility functions differ, the theory of collective choice should be of some positive worth,
but they do not examine what worth it would be and how it would be need to be adapted for such cases.335 PUBLIC CHOICE AND ALTRUISM
3. For summaries of both theoretical an empirical evidence, see Ostrom [2000] and Fehr and Schmidt
[2001].
4. Nozick [1974] uses a similar list of personalities to illustrate the difficulty of determining one utopia for
everyone.
5. But since this paper deals with the public sphere, these preferences need not be nosy, although they
may be arrogant.
6. For example no amount of altruism will tell you whether it is better for you to drive on the right or the
left side of the road.
7. Tideman [1994] and Young [1988] are examples.
8. The difference between this point and Klein [1994] is important. He explains how people believe in
principles that are consistent with their self-interest so that behavior that appears to be cynical may
actually be principled. (Such as the lobbyist for the defense industry who sincerely believes that a
nuclear defense shield is necessary.) The argument here is that policies based on a principled belief of
what is good for society are just as harmful to those who oppose those policies on principle as selfish
policies are to people who oppose those policies out of self-interest. (Such as the hawk with no personal
connection to the defense industry who forces a nuclear defense shield on society as a whole solely
because she believes it to be best for society, even though she knows that society includes doves who do
not agree that a defense shield is best for society as a whole.)
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